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The case for ‘slow science’
Abstract
This contribution offers a reflection on the shift in social science to-
wards participative enquiry and collaborative research practices. In 
doing so, the paper challenges the common conception that the 
methodological indeterminacy that participatory research may oc-
casion undermines its scientific credentials by rendering its pro-
cesses and outcomes vulnerable to idiosyncratic events, subjective 
interpretations, local variability and chancy outcomes. The focus of 
the article is not just that participatory processes require research 
flexibility to enhance the pragmatic outcomes of research, but that 
the researcher’s theory and methodology may need to be recali-
brated from discipline-controlled givens to publicly-negotiable 
points of departure. This latter point expands the paper’s argument 
to advocate for research that has “the power to be affected” (Hardt 
2007, x) by the views, feelings and experiences of those it targets, 
and of those affected by its processes and conclusions. Using video-
reflexive ethnography to illustrate this point, the article exemplifies 
what it means for the researcher(s) to be affected by the constraints 
Volume
23 110







inherent in their own research approach and disciplinary priorities 
(Iedema 2021).
Keywords: participative research, slow science, affect, reflexivity, 
video-reflexive ethnography  
Introduction
This contribution offers a reflection on the shift in social science to-
wards participative enquiry and collaborative research practices. 
This shift occurs at a time when there is a growing general senti-
ment that science and technology – collectively constituting a ‘sci-
entific-technocratic order’ - are becoming less accessible to public 
involvement. This is due to this scientific-technocratic order becom-
ing embedded in “computerized networks that provide few mean-
ingful possibilities for citizen participation” (Fisher 1999, 295). 
Counter-balancing this, the last two to three decades have wit-
nessed a corrective to this scientific-technocratic opacity, with ef-
forts afoot to optimise public involvement in science in various 
ways and to various degrees (Strasser et al. 2019). Specifically, the 
shift towards participative enquiry may be seen to be part of this 
development to ensure that those who are the object and subject of 
(social) science are able to maximise the appropriateness of its foci, 
directions, operations and applications. 
Today, participative enquiry and collaborative research practices 
generally are integral to how many research projects around the 
world are designed. In the UK, involving service providers and ser-
vice users in studies of service processes and in discussions about 
outcomes is now de rigueur from a grant funding perspective. The 
UK’s National Institute for Health Research initiated a public in-
volvement drive titled INVOLVE (superseded in 2020 by the NIHR 
Centre for Engagement & Dissemination1). Endeavours such as 
these are aimed at optimising citizen involvement in and public un-
derstanding of healthcare (service) funded projects. What these de-
velopments confirm is that the label ‘expertise’, besides being as-
sociated with knowledge, specialisation and professionalism, may 
now also be applied to very different epistemic practices anchored 
in first-hand experience, lived reflection and creative-artistic dis-
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covery. In all, life world and science now find themselves on a dif-
ferent, if not more equitable, footing than was the case in the past.2 
The deliberative orientation of participative enquiry soon became 
prominent in domains like collaborative public planning (Innes and 
Booher 1999) and community development (Craig, Mayo, and Pop-
ple 2011). These domains have exploited for considerable time now 
the community building opportunities that are inherent in public 
deliberation. As Craig et al suggest, public deliberation is unique as 
it harbours the possibility of participants co-creating ‘live meaning’ 
on the strength of their current socio-political circumstances and 
evolving experiences. Involving the public in this way results in … 
an ‘embodied argument’ [since it is] a continuing search 
for new forms of social and political expression, particu-
larly ‘at the grassroots level’ (within a participatory para-
digm), in the light of new forms of political and social 
control. (Craig, Mayo, and Popple 2011, 7)
The aim to ensure that research across the board engages with ‘new 
forms of social and political expression [arising from] new forms of 
political and social control’ has recently been articulated with re-
newed conviction in Isabelle Stengers’ Another science is possible: A 
manifesto for slow science (Stengers 2018). In this book, she defines 
‘slow science’ in opposition to ‘fast science’. The latter prioritises 
outcomes achieved through practical inflexibility and methodolog-
ical intransigence that are touted as instantiating ‘scientific rigour’. 
This rigour offers material evidence and procedural reassurance for 
fast science’s claim to be able to realise objectivity: its ‘point of view 
from nowhere’ (Nagel 1989). In contrast, slow science prioritises 
openness to and deliberation with those represented by, interested 
in, targeted with and affected by scientific research outcomes. The 
direction and effect of such deliberations are ‘soft’ in so far as that 
they remain open-ended and under-determined. 
The present paper explores the implications of Stengers’ slow sci-
ence argument for science generally and for social science in spe-
cific. In exploring these implications, the paper questions the com-
mon conception that methodological indeterminacy undermines 
scientific endeavours by rendering their processes and outcomes 
vulnerable to idiosyncratic events, subjective interpretations, local 
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variability and chancy outcomes. The unique focus of the present 
article and less frequently discussed in the social science literature, 
however, is not just that participants’ involvement may engender 
research foci, processes and insights that move beyond the remit of 
what researchers might be able to conceive or achieve on their own. 
In this paper’s conception of ‘slow social science’, the researcher’s 
theory and methodology are recalibrated from discipline-controlled 
givens to publicly-negotiable points of departure. This latter objec-
tive requires the paper to connect Stengers’ slow science argument 
to the idea of research that has “the power to be affected” (Hardt 
2007, x) by the views and feelings of those it targets and those af-
fected by its findings and conclusions (Iedema 2021).
Science that commands ‘a power to be affected’
Spinoza (1632-1677) conceived of people’s ‘power to be affected’ as 
a critical feature for them to be able to assume the role of early mod-
ern citizen who cohabitates in and provides the socio-cultural condi-
tion of possibility for the then emerging nation states (Steinberg 
2020, 2018). Citizens could not be people who adhered rigidly and 
defensively to their own habits, knowledges and mores. They need-
ed to be people who were able to discern and acknowledge (criti-
cally or imitatively) the validity of the values, ideas and expectations 
of others around them. Spinoza’s ‘power to be affected’, then, was 
and is a power that grew (grows) from people being able to negoti-
ate diversity and achieve a measure of allegiance under circum-
stances of significant socio-political change and religious tension. 
For Spinoza, it was neither the novel practices, knowledges and 
riches of mercantilism, nor the fear inspired by increasingly well-
organised and newly bureaucratised-militarised state power that 
took priority and precedence over the formation of the early nation 
state. For Spinoza, paramount was affect; that is, people’s ability to 
be affected by, and through that learn from and be motivated to 
negotiate novel forms of life into being with other others – people 
assuming the role ‘fellow citizens’. Spinoza’s emerging citizenry 
was instructed to be sufficiently open to (i.e. affected by) different 
others to experience, question, and alter its own responses to a mul-











We can draw a parallel between Spinoza’s 17th century psycho-
politics and today’s science. As did the 16th century pre-nation state 
denizen, 20th century science prioritised its own practices and val-
ues. It pursued the economic-procedural goals of discovery and 
progress at the expense of openness before those whom it affects in 
their everyday lives. Isabelle Stengers refers to this science as ‘fast 
science’ (Stengers 2018). Having come up against its own limits (La-
tour 2018), 21st century science has had to ‘slow down’ in the face of 
environmental degradation; that is, take time to account for the 
views of stakeholders who may be affected by the findings and out-
comes such science produces. This is ‘slow science’ (Stengers 2018) 
as it displays a ‘power to be affected’ by those whom it analyses and 
whose lives it affects. It balances scientific expertise and affect by 
positing dynamic public deliberation as its own condition of possi-
bility and legitimacy. 
Social science has also slowed down. It invented action research, 
participatory inquiry, appreciative inquiry, and a host of other ap-
proaches that have sought to involve research subjects in decisions 
about what to study and how (Creswell 2009). In effect, these are 
examples of slow social science that operate at the intersection of 
affect, openness, expertise, analysis and complexity. Its researchers 
are ‘passivity competent’ actors (Sloterdijk 2013) whose …
… passivity competent conduct belongs to the play/game 
intelligence that defines all people living in the contempo-
rary networked world, where we cannot make a move 
without also being moved. … Allowing oneself to be af-
fected symbolises the situation of all those who intervene 
in themselves through allowing others to intervene in 
them … [this makes possible] participation in unfamiliar 
competences [Fremdcompetenz].3 (Sloterdijk 2009, 593/4)
While Sloterdijk does not invoke Spinoza explicitly, his ‘passivity 
competent conduct’ is conditional on Spinoza’s ‘power to be affect-
ed’. Hardt’s rendering of Spinoza’s premise may clarify its connec-
tion to Sloterdijk’s conception: 
The greater our power to be affected… the greater our 
power to act [and] every increase of the power to act 
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and think corresponds to an increased power to be af-
fected - the increased autonomy of the subject, in other 
words, always corresponds to its increased receptivity. 
(Hardt 2007, x)
Our increased receptivity manifests as passivity competent con-
duct: we can now register and respond to subtle and rapid changes 
in our environment and relationships. 
The rationale for this receptivity and passivity-competent con-
duct is found in the rising complexity of contemporary existence 
(Beck 1992; Giddens 1990; Castells 2000; Sloterdijk 2013). Our in-
terest in affect, receptivity and passivity competent conducts, and 
researchers’ interest in participative social science, thus mark the 
contemporary intensification of change, pace and movement that 
is increasingly apparent across identities, practices, communities 
and cultures. 
Implications for (social) science
Science has met the demands of rising contemporary complexity by 
expanding its data remit, speeding up the pace of feedback, and 
compressing the distance between knowledge and life. Expanding 
its remit is achieved through multiplying data points. Speeding up 
feedback is achieved through the automation of data processing 
and results deployment. Compressing the distance between science 
and life occurs through colonising growing swathes of life as data 
sources and feedback domains. 
These developments notwithstanding, their progressive technol-
ogisation risks reifying their operations and response modes, deny-
ing them input from relevant unanticipated perturbations and un-
suspected developments. While science is increasingly able to keep 
abreast of rapid and subtle changes in its target domains, its expo-
nential automation decreases its ability to attain the power neces-
sary ‘to be affected’ for it to open up to more than that which it has 
pre-determined to be of scientific interest and importance. 
A power to be affected, by contrast, manifests in science’s open-
ness to the concerns of an expanding set of people, and broaden-
ing feedback about issues affected by it and by what it brings 
forth. Here, the aim of progress is balanced against the aim of re-
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ceptivity to life world experiences of impact. This is what defines 
Stengers’ slow science: a science that considers its effects on peo-
ple and places, and one that alters its assumptions, processes and 
outcomes accordingly. 
When it comes to studying social life, social scientific endeavours 
are now prioritising deliberative engagement with complex forms 
of life over adherence to methodological schemas and programmes. 
One example of this trend is ‘post-qualitative inquiry’ (St. Pierre, 
2018; Lather and St. Pierre 2013). Post-qualitative inquiry calls into 
question the priority given in qualitative research to scientific rig-
our and pre-determined methodology in a world that is increas-
ingly complex and therefore increasingly entangled:
… entanglement makes all the categories of humanist 
qualitative research problematic. For example, how do we 
determine the ‘object of our knowledge’ – the ‘problem’ 
we want to study in assemblage? Can we disconnect our-
selves from the mangle somehow (Self) and then carefully 
disconnect some other small piece of the mangle (Other) 
long enough to study it? (Lather and St. Pierre 2013, 630)
For these scholars, the principle of rigour and the constraint of 
methodology, instead of legitimising the research that is conduct-
ed following their rules and procedures, are reframed as the re-
searcher’s taken-as-given attachments that serve to buttress re-
searcher identity: 
The ethical charge of our work as inquirers is surely to 
question our attachments that keep us from thinking and 
living differently. (Lather and St. Pierre 2013, 631)
This critique then homes in on the following convention: science de-
fines the phenomena, including any complexities, that warrant be-
ing analysed, and it frames these phenomena in ways that at once 
accommodate and consolidate researchers’ ‘attachments’: their 
training, practices and theorisations. Questioning these conventions 
as arbitrary attachments, the post-qualitative critique insists that
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… we have to ask whether we have become so attached to 
our invention – qualitative research – that we have come 
to think it is real. Have we forgotten that we made it up? 
Could we just leave it behind and do/live something 
else? (Lather and St. Pierre 2013, 631)
It is here that the post-qualitative critique meets the argument de-
veloped above for research to assume ‘the power to be affected’. 
The post-qualitative critique refuses to sweep the ‘mess’ that is so-
cial research (Law 2004) under the carpet, and resists attempts to 
render invisible the whole ‘hinterland’ of complexities that is the 
full intensity of social life. Put differently, this critique prioritises 
sensitivity and responsiveness to the complexities it encounters 
over the methods promoted within research disciplines. Here is 
Law articulating similar convictions almost 20 years ago:
Method, then, unavoidably produces not only truths 
and non-truths, realities and non-realities, presences and 
absences, but also arrangements with political implica-
tions. It crafts arrangements and gatherings of things – 
and accounts of the arrangements of those things – that 
could have been otherwise. But how to think this? How 
to move away from the idea that method is a technical 
(or moralising) set of procedures that need to be got right 
in a particular way? How to move from the legislations 
that we usually find in the textbooks on method? Away 
from the completed and closed accounts of method? 
(Law 2004, 143)
As does Law, post-qualitative critique charges contemporary social 
science with failing to be sufficiently affected by the social com-
plexities it studies when such science requires a predetermined 
methodology for encountering life. Post-qualitative enquiry’s in-
sistence on relaxing social scientific attachments to the invention of 
qualitative research, like Law’s argument in favour of moving on 
from method, help clarify the implications of contemporary com-
plexity for social science research. Here we see an inversion from 
research as knowledge-building endeavour to research as commu-
nity generative dynamic. The latter can be called ‘spherogenic’ 
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(Iedema and Carroll 2015) in that such research gathers stakehold-
ers around a problem and initiates forums for their deliberation. It 
does this not simply to produce pragmatic outcomes, but also to 
experiment with its own methodological strictures and scientific as-
sumptions. 
Research and the power to be affected
One such spherogenic research modality is video-reflexive ethnog-
raphy or VRE. VRE researchers prioritise the relational dynamics 
that ensue with participants – those interested enough to partake. 
Researchers arrive with some sense of what their study entails, but 
negotiate the interpretation and execution of their study with par-
ticipants. VRE uses open-ended deliberation and video footage as 
more-or-less neutral meeting points. In generating, choosing and 
showing back footage, the researcher puts themselves at risk as 
their choices may be questioned, their interpretations corrected, 
and their conclusions challenged (Carroll 2009). For these dynamics 
to occur, footage of in situ practice is used as minimally-processed 
and publicly-accessible representational resource. The act of gener-
ating data (footage) that may be questioned and challenged sets up 
a productive tension between participatory social science – the dy-
namic that manifests when distance is created between observer 
and observed – and life. 
Specifically, footage of in situ practice reveals what Ingold refers 
to as the experimental dimension of everyday life: “for the people 
who live there, quotidian life is experimental through and through” 
(Ingold 2011, 15). Social scientific analysis tends to gloss over the 
uncertain dynamics of in situ experimentation and prioritise a 
more general perspective that foregrounds regularities (cf. ‘dis-
courses’, ‘practices’, ‘ethnomethodologies’, etc.). When negotiated 
with those who populate the footage or are familiar with the prac-
tice portrayed, such footage brings its affective, embodied, ens-
paced, political and situational dimensions to the fore. People’s 
habits and assumptions are bared, revealing the delicate character 
of in situ existence. 
In this way, footage perturbs ordinary observer-observed config-
urations for both participants and researchers. On the one hand, the 
individual as the centre of agency becomes dispersed across affects, 
habits, moves, discourses, events. This decentring throws light on 
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the practised and habituated aspects of behaviour. It also reveals 
the delicate affective-pragmatic negotiations that take place ‘under 
the radar’, as these are now visible. This may produce defensive 
responses to problems, but it may also lead to actors exploring how 
they may be able to move forward into the future together. On the 
other hand, the footage renders the researcher(s) immediately ac-
countable to participants for their data (footage) choices and feed-
back reasoning (the reasons for selecting situations for video-film-
ing and for deciding on clips for feedback). Their accountability to 
participants is no longer dealt with purely in the abstract realm of 
the ethics application, but is now also rooted in the complex dy-
namic life world where their research, research relationships and 
research outcomes unfold. 
It is here that research participation serves not in the first instance 
the pre-meditated interests of the researcher, as it now pursues the 
flourishing of all life. This pursuit of everyone’s flourishing is also a 
Spinozan conception dictating the enhancement of people’s agency, 
or to use Deleuze’s expression, the creation of ‘a world that is in-
creasingly wide and intense’: 
It is no longer a matter of utilisations or captures, but of 
sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter 
into composition with one another in order to form a 
higher individual, ad infinitum? Now we are concerned 
… with a symphony of nature, the composition of a world 
that is increasingly wide and intense. (Deleuze 2005, 60)
This priority of life enhancement skews research towards the be-
coming of life without pre-empting or confining its methodology, 
quality, scope or directions. It also confirms the defining role of ex-
perimentation in life and this renders experimentation the raison 
d’etre of participatory social research. It is now participants’ and re-
searchers’ capacity to be affected, and its impact on their agency 
and life world, practically, methodologically and theoretically, that 
matter. Only once life has a chance to become more ‘wide and in-
tense’ for participants and researchers, kicks in another but always 
secondary research intervention: the capture, or scholarly descrip-
tion, of how the relational and communicative dynamics of this en-
deavour have made life more ‘wide and intense’. 
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This paper has engaged with the question of participative social sci-
ence from the perspective of a research modality that prioritises its 
‘power to be affected’. This modality conceives of participation not 
as a means to satisfy pre-determined scientific goals, but as a dy-
namic that may render life more ‘wide and intense’. The route that 
led to this position visited the slow science arguments articulated 
by Stengers, Spinoza’s ethics that prizes our power to be affected, 
Ingold’s caveat that everyday life is experimental through and 
through, and Sloterdijk’s view on contemporary complexity as ne-
cessitating the capacity on the part of actors to recognise that mak-
ing a move means being moved. The paper touched on critiques of 
social science that called into question its prioritisation of pre-deter-
mined methodologies and programmes. Lather, St Pierre and Law 
were mentioned as proponents of relaxing the rules governing so-
cial science research in order for such research to become more re-
sponsive and receptive to contemporary complexity, and become 
more flexible and learning-capable towards its own approaches de-
ployed to apprehend social life.
The paper finished with a description of a research approach that 
instantiates these latter values. Video-reflexive ethnography was 
presented as example of research that invests first in enhancing life 
for and with those choosing to participate in its dynamic. No doubt, 
other approaches are similarly invested and focused on the enabling 
dynamics of social inquiry. For now, the argument in favour of re-
search participation concludes like this: the novelty that springs 
from people being enabled to strengthen their practical and relation-
al agency is of significance not just for life generally, but also for that 
unique modality of social science that chooses to engage with life’s 
complexity. This modality of social science treats (a chosen dimen-
sion of) life not as fixable, accountable and describable object, but as 
a space where participants and researchers interact to enable their 
worlds and activities to become increasingly ‘wide and intense’.  
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2 For reasons of space, this article will not deal with the adverse ‘post-
truth’ consequences of this emancipation which are eloquently detailed 
elsewhere (Fuller 2017; Higgins 2016), other than to investigate the ef-
fects of technologization on the practices of social knowing and com-
municating.
3 My own translation since the official English translation of Sloterdijk’s 
book (see bibliography) is suboptimal. The original German reads: “In 
Wahrheit gehört das passivitätskompetente Verhalten zur Spielintelli-
genz von Menschen in einer entfalteten Netzwelt, in der man keinen 
eigenen Zug machen kann, wenn man nicht zugleich mit sich spielen 
läßt. … Sich-Massieren-Lassen symbolisiert die Lage all derer, die auf 
sich inwirken, indem sie anderen erlauben, auf sie einzuwerken … Teil-
habe an Fremdcompetenz.”
